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By Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer
Starting with Jack Knetsch (1989), ex-
periments on the \endowment eect"
(Richard Thaler 1980) typically rely on a
two-stage procedure. In the rst stage,
subjects are endowed with a good, such as
a mug. In the second stage, the same sub-
jects are given the opportunity to trade this
good for another good of similar value, such
as a pen. The endowment eect holds that
very few subjects chose to trade, sometimes
as few as 10%. In related experiments, sub-
jects state selling prices for their endow-
ment, which are much higher than their
buying prices for the same good. These pat-
terns are hard to reconcile with standard
choice theory, which predicts that about
half the subjects would trade and that sell-
ing prices and buying prices are similar.
The common explanation of this evi-
dence relies on Prospect Theory's loss aver-
sion (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tver-
sky 1979). Because the pain of parting
with the endowment looms larger in the de-
cision maker's mind than the pleasure of
acquiring a good of similar value (Kahne-
man, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991), a decision
maker endowed with a mug is unwilling to
trade it for a pen (or states a high selling
price).1
Recent experimental evidence, however,
suggests that loss aversion relative to expec-
tations may not be the whole story. Per-
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1By modeling the reference point as expectations,
Botond Koszegi and Matthew Rabin (2006) reconciled
the endowment eect with the fact that people trade in
large amounts if they expect to do so. See also John
List (2003), Keith Ericson and Andreas Fuster (2011)
and Ori Heetz and List (2011).
haps the most revealing fact is that the en-
dowment eect is sensitive to the type of
goods involved and to the information avail-
able about them. Nathan Novemsky and
Kahneman (2005) argue that the endow-
ment eect should not arise in exchanges
of identical goods. Lyle Brenner, Yuval
Rottenstreich, Sanjay Sood and Baler Bil-
gin (2007) show that the pattern reverses
in experiments concerning bads rather than
goods, as decision makers become system-
atically eager to trade away their bad en-
dowment. In experiments investigating the
gap between selling and buying prices, the
gap is sensitive to information about the
market price of the endowment (Raymond
Weaver and Shane Frederick 2011).
A common thread of these works is that
contextual factors such as the nature of the
goods involved or the information provided
about market prices systematically aect
the manifestation of the endowment eect
in ways dicult to reconcile with standard
accounts based on reference points and loss
aversion. In this paper, we try to account
for these ndings by modeling the endow-
ment eect as a form of context depen-
dence, arising through the salience mech-
anism described in Bordalo, Gennaioli, and
Shleifer (BGS 2011 a,b). As reviewed next,
when a decision maker contemplates the op-
tions available to him, he focuses on { and
gives disproportionate weight to { those fea-
tures along which each option \stands out",
or is salient, relative to the other options.
In this way, a good's salient features, and
thus its evaluation, depend on what it is
compared to. The gist of our salience-based
explanation of the endowment eect is that
the two-stage procedure implemented in ex-
periments (but perhaps also the experience
of ownership in the real world) implies that
the endowed good and the other goods are
evaluated in dierent contexts.
Specically, after the decision maker is
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given the endowment good e, he values it
in comparison with his status-quo of having
nothing. In this context, what stands out
are good e's best attributes. The decision
maker overweights these attributes, which
leads to an overvaluation of good e. This
captures a perceptual \warm glow" induced
by receiving a gift or getting ownership of
an object (Tversky and Dale Grin, 1991),
driven by the decision maker's focus on that
object's upside. In the second (trade) stage,
the decision maker is given the option to
trade the endowment e for a new good n.
Now the evaluation of n is shaped not only
by the backdrop of having nothing but also
by the contrast between n and e. When this
contrast makes salient the new good's dis-
advantage relative to the endowment, the
decision maker undervalues the new good
and displays the endowment eect.
The critical asymmetry between the en-
dowment and the new good comes from the
warm glow of ownership: when the decision
maker receives a mug, he focuses on its most
valuable uses. These uses are still present
in his mind when he considers exchanging
the mug for a pen, so that the mug's val-
uation persists in the second stage. This
logic yields the new predictions that the en-
dowment eect should be reversed in the
case of bads, should not arise when identi-
cal goods are exchanged, and that its mani-
festation should be sensitive to information
about market prices.
I. Salience
Following BGS (2011b), we consider the
simplest case of two-attribute goods, where
a generic good k is a two dimensional vector
of qualities (q1k;q2k) 2 R2, and the decision
maker's intrinsic utility is linear in the at-
tributes, v(q1k;q2k) = w1q1k + w2q2k, where
the weights wi sum up to 1. The perceived
value of the good, however, diers from its
intrinsic value because the decision maker
overweights the good's salient attribute at
the expense of its non-salient attribute: if
attribute i is salient and attribute j is not,
then the decision maker evaluates good k
with weights given by
wLT
i
wLT
j
=
1


wi
wj
; w
LT
i + w
LT
j = 1;
where  2 (0;1] captures the degree to
which the decision maker neglects non
salient features. Referring to such neglect,
we call our decision maker a \local thinker"
(when  = 1 the local thinker is a standard
rational decision maker).
Which attribute is salient for good k de-
pends on two factors: the decision maker's
consideration set C and a salience function
 : R2 ! R+. The set C includes the goods
considered by the decision maker when eval-
uating good k, and provides our measure of
context. The salience of attribute i = 1;2
for good k is a function (qi;k;qi) that mea-
sures the extent to which the good's at-
tribute i \stands out" relative to its average
value qi in C. This intuition is in line with
well established features of human percep-
tion: our visual apparatus automatically al-
locates scarce attentional resources to as-
pects of the environment that are most sur-
prising or dierent from what is expected.
To capture these features of perception, we
assume that the salience function satises
three properties: i) ordering: whenever an
interval [x;y] is contained in a larger in-
terval [x0;y0], we have (x;y) < (x0;y0);
ii) diminishing sensitivity (Weber's law):
for all x;y > 0 and any  > 0, we have
(x+;y +) < (x;y); and iii) reection:
if x;y;x0;y0 > 0 then (x;y) < (x0;y0) if
and only if ( x; y) < ( x0; y0).
Following BGS (2011 b), we use a salience
function symmetric and homogenous of de-
gree zero ((x;y) = (x;y) = (y;x)
for all  > 0, with (0;0) = 0), which
is sucient to ensure diminishing sensi-
tivity. A typical example is (x;y) =
jx   yj=(jxj + jyj). Due to ordering,
salience (qik;qi) increases with the dis-
tance jqik   qij. Due to diminishing sensi-
tivity and reection (qik;qi) decreases as
qik and qi rise in absolute value.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SALIENCE AND THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT 3
II. Of Mugs and Pens
To formalize trade of mugs for pens, sup-
pose that q1 captures a good's \quality for
drinking" while q2 is its \quality for writ-
ing" (both measured in utils), and that the
decision maker puts equal weight on both
attributes, w1 = w2 = 1=2. A mug M is
a good (qM;0), a pen P is a good (0;qP),
where the zeroes capture the fact that ex-
periments involve no writing mugs or drink-
ing pens.2 Suppose further that M and P
have the same quality level qM = qP = q.
Then, absent salience distortions, the deci-
sion maker values both objects at q=2.
As the decision maker is given the mug
in the endowment stage, he evaluates M
against the status quo (0;0) of not hav-
ing it. The consideration set is Ce =
f(q;0);(0;0)g and the average good is
(q=2;0). By ordering, the quality of the
mug is salient: (q;q=2) > (0;0) = 0.
The local thinker weighs by 1=(1 + ) the
mug's quality for drinking and by =(1+)
its (zero) quality for writing, so that the
weights add up to one. The mug's perceived
value is:
(1) v
LT(MjC
e) = q 
1
1 + 
> q 
1
2
.
The mug is overvalued because its quality is
salient against the backdrop of not having
it. Since in the endowment stage the lo-
cal thinker's focus is on the mug's quality,
this focus should also play a role when he
subsequently considers whether to trade the
mug. To capture this idea in a simple way,
we assume that the mug's salience ranking
in the endowment stage carries through to
the trading stage with probability : when
 > 0 there is a warm glow of ownership in
the trading stage.
In the trading stage, the decision maker
must decide whether to trade his mug for
a pen. The consideration set thus becomes
Ct = f(q;0);(0;0);(0;q)g, and the average
good is (q=3;q=3).3 As a result, the pen's
2The main results go through for complex goods hav-
ing non-zero attribute values.
3Removing decision maker's status quo (0;0) from
Ct does not substantially aect our analysis.
quality for writing is not salient because:
(0;q=3) > (q;q=3) , (0;1=3) > (1;1=3),
which follows from homogeneity of degree
zero. Due to diminishing sensitivity, the
pen's complete lack of quality for drinking
is more salient than its higher-than-average
quality for writing, implying that at the
trading stage the value of the pen is
(2) v
LT(PjC
t) = q 

1 + 
< q 
1
2
.
Because the mug and the pen are per-
fectly symmetric goods, in the trading stage
Ct they both have a salient downside. How-
ever, accounting for the warm glow of own-
ership, the mug's average valuation in the
second stage is:
(3) v
LT(MjC
t;C
e) = q 
(1   ) + 
1 + 
.
The mug may also be undervalued relative
to the rational case. However, as long as
 > 0 it is valued more than the pen. As
a consequence, the local thinker keeps it,
exhibiting the endowment eect.4 If  = 0,
the endowment eect disappears.
This mechanism can provide a context-
based foundation for loss aversion based on
the idea that the valuation of the goods we
own is at least partly formed against the
backdrop of not having them, while trades
are valued by comparing exchange options.5
The rst comparison induces us to focus on
the best attributes of the goods we own,
while the second comparison induces us to
focus on either good's relative disadvan-
tages. The combination of the two stages
boosts the relative valuation of the goods
we own. This perspective on the endow-
ment eect makes several testable predic-
tions:
4Expression (3) can also be interpreted as the eval-
uation of a subject who averages between the salience
rankings of the two stages.
5If the pen is suciently better than the mug, e.g.
qP > qM 
h
1 +  1 

i
, the local thinker will trade the
pen for the mug (even though the pen's downside is
still salient). The coecient in square brackets can be
viewed as the loss aversion parameter.4 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2012
i) If the good available for trade is
an identical mug, (q;0), then Ct =
f(q;0);(0;0);(q;0)g, and the average good
is (2q=3;0). Because (q;2q=3) > (0;0),
the upside is salient both for the new mug
and for the original one, so both are valued
at (1). There is no endowment eect for
identical objects. Similarly, if the new good
is a better mug, (2q;0), the decision maker
likewise focuses on its upside and overvalues
it. There is no endowment eect in upgrad-
ing. The endowment eect requires a trade-
o between the endowed good and the new
good.
ii) If the endowment is a bad ( q;0),
then in the endowment stage the decision
maker focuses on the bad's downside be-
cause ( q; q=2) > (0;0). Given the op-
tion to trade the endowment with a dier-
ent bad (0; q), he focuses on the upside 0
of the latter: by diminishing sensitivity and
reection (0; q=3) > ( q; q=3). In the
case of bads there is then a \cold glow"of
ownership and people are overly willing to
trade their lot. There is a reverse endow-
ment eect for bads.
iii) If the endowment is a pen and a mug,
the warm glow of ownership would apply to
all goods. As a result, keeping the assump-
tion of linear utility, the decision maker is
no longer reluctant to exchange a mug for
a pen (or vice versa) in the trading stage.
Thus, there is no endowment eect for com-
prehensive endowments.
III. Of Mugs and Bucks
We now turn to the experimental evi-
dence of a gap between decision makers'
willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness
to accept (WTA). Consider again the case
of a mug of quality q. Here q1 is the qual-
ity q of the mug while q2 =  p is its price
disutility. The utility from the mug (q; p)
is q=2   p=2.
In the endowment stage the consideration
set is Ce = f(q;0);(0;0)g and the mug's up-
side is salient. In the trading stage the deci-
sion maker includes in the consideration set
the option (0;WTA) of obtaining his WTA,
so CWTA = f(q;0);(0;0);(0;WTA)g. As
before, by diminishing sensitivity the down-
side of all options in CWTA is salient. The
decision maker's utility from (0;WTA) is:
(4)
v
LT((0;WTA)jC
WTA) = WTA

1 + 
<
WTA
2
.
The monetary gain is undervalued because
the decision maker focuses on the loss of
the mug. The value of the mug is equal to
(3) as before. The decision maker's WTA
equates (4) and (3) and is thus equal to:
(5) WTA = q 

1 +  
1   


.
Consider now the decision maker's WTP
for the mug. Because he is not endowed
with the mug, he has no warm glow of
ownership. He then determines his WTP
in CWTP = f(q; WTP);(0;0)g. Now the
price and the quality of the mug are equally
salient, so the decision maker states his cor-
rect valuation:
(6) WTP = q.
Compare (5) to (6): in line with the endow-
ment eect, there is a positive WTA-WTP
gap, equal to q    (1   )=. This gap is
shaped by the warm glow of ownership ,
as well as by the extent of local thinking .
Additional evidence for this mechanism
is provided by by Kahneman et al (1991).
Consider a decision maker who is not en-
dowed with a mug, but is asked for his
mug cash-equivalent at the trading stage.
He faces a problem identical to that of the
endowed subject, namely, nding the price
at which he is indierent between receiving
that price or the mug. Yet, due to the ab-
sence of warm glow ( = 0), we predict that
this subject's WTA is given by (6) and not
by (5). This is consistent with Kahneman
et al's (1991) ndings.
Weaver and Frederick (2011) show that
the WTA-WTP gap changes when subjects
are provided with information about the
mug's market price. The dependence of
WTA and WTP on market prices is not in
itself surprising. With a high market price
pM > q, a rational decision maker expecting
to sell the mug in the market with probabil-VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SALIENCE AND THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT 5
ity  (and to keep it with probability 1 )
values the mug at pM+(1 )q. The value
of the mug clearly increases in pM, but of
course there is no endowment eect.6 What
needs to be explained is the persistence of
the WTA-WTP gap, and its amplication
with high market prices.
From the local thinker's perspective,
information about market prices simply
brings to his attention an alternative
valuation of the mug besides consump-
tion, namely the possibility of trading
at the market price. Relative to the
case of no reference prices, the local
thinker's consideration set in the trad-
ing stage now includes the option (0;pM)
of selling the mug in the market, Ct =
f(q;0);(0;0);(0;WTA);(0;pM)g. To deter-
mine WTA, note that also in this con-
text the downside of each option is salient.
Moreover, the mug's quality is boosted by
1= due to the warm glow of endowment, as
in (5) (where for simplicity we set  = 1).
The decision maker's selling price is thus
(7) WTA = pM + (1   )q 
1

.
When stating his WTP for a mug, how-
ever, the local thinker's consideration set
is CWTP = f(q; WTP);(0;0);(0;pM  
WTP)g, which also takes into account the
possibility of trading the mug at market
price, namely (0;pM   WTP). Then, pro-
vided the market price is suciently high
relative to q,7 the downside of each option is
salient. In particular, the price WTP paid
when buying the mug is very salient to the
buyer. Thus, given an expectation  of re-
selling the mug, the local thinker's buying
price is
(8) WTP = (pM + (1   )q) 
1
 +
1 

Equations (7) and (8) capture the WTA-
WTP gap in the presence of reference
6The probability  of trade is taken to be rational
and exogenous, and may depend on the cost/ease of
nding trading partners.
7Formally, this is true when pM > 2  WTP, where
WTP is given by (8). This follows from pM > q if trade
is unlikely and  is small.
prices. Two points can be noted. First,
the gap arises whenever the local thinker is
not certain about trading: for any  < 1
(and  < 1) we have WTA > WTP.8
When  = 1 the gap disappears as WTA =
WTP = pM, just as in the rational case.
Second, consistent with Weaver and Fred-
erick, the selling price is more sensitive than
the buying price to pM when pM is high. In
this regime the WTA-WTP gap increases
with the good's market (or reference) price.
A similar calculation shows that when pM
is low relative to q, the selling price is less
sensitive than the buying price to pM. In
this case, as pM becomes smaller the WTA-
WTP gap increases, resulting in a U-shaped
relation between WTA-WTP gap and pM.9
IV. Conclusion
Unlike Prospect Theory, our model does
not feature loss aversion, either in the util-
ity or in the salience functions, which can
both be symmetric in gains and losses [e.g.
the salience function may satisfy ( q;0) =
(q;0)]. We have shut down any mecha-
nism involving loss aversion relative to ex-
pectations. The mechanism we propose is
based on the novel ingredients of salience
and context dependence.
Our approach highlights a fundamental
dierence between the context of absolute
evaluation, in the endowment stage, and
the context of comparative evaluation, in
the trading stage. In the former, the de-
cision maker focuses on the endowment's
most extreme attribute (due to the ordering
property of salience), whereas in the latter
his attention is drawn to the alternative's
downside (due to diminishing sensitivity),
generating an endowment eect. In our
view, what makes ownership special is the
8This is the case even if  = 0. The asymmetry
between buying and selling arises at the trade stage:
since downsides are salient, the buying price is relatively
more salient for the buyer.
9This feature is also predicted by Weaver and Fred-
erick, who provide suggestive evidence for it. To see
how it arises in our model, note that when pM < q, the
owner of the mug never sells it in the market, and sets
WTA = q=(1 + ). The subject without a mug can try
to buy it in the market. His consideration set is then
Ct = f(q; WTP);(0;0);(q; pM)g and so his buying
price WTP decreases as pM goes to zero.6 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2012
focus on the most attractive attributes of
the goods one owns; there is no warm glow
of ownership when these attributes are sur-
passed.
This intuition highlights a deep connec-
tion between the endowment eect and at-
titudes towards risk. In BGS (2011a) we
showed how the same mechanism of salience
can shed light on risk attitudes, whereby
the decision maker is risk averse if he fo-
cuses on a risky lottery's downside, and risk
seeking if he focuses on its upside. Simi-
larly, here the endowment eect is due to an
aversion to the alternative good generated
by focusing on its downside.10 Moreover,
just as BGS (2011a) show that salience gen-
erates a shift from risk seeking to risk aver-
sion as lottery gains are reected into losses,
here we predict a reverse endowment ef-
fect for bads. Salience therefore provides
a unied account of disparate puzzles such
as the endowment eect, preference rever-
sals, and the public health dilemma as the
consequence of the same perceptual forces
of diminishing sensitivity and ordering ap-
plied to dierent contexts of absolute and
comparative evaluation.
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